

CONTACT REPORT

CARROIT/CARBOHYDRATE

28 Sept 54

Date, Place, and Time of Meeting: 27 Sept 54, 2000-2130, at CARBOHYDRATE's apt.

Present: a. CARBOHYDRATE b. C

1. CARBOHYDRATE delivered the following written material:

a. General report containing peripheral SSD info gained through various visitor interviews. Report was screened in some detail to see whether any of the visitors should have been flushed to CASTABIA, if possible. It seemed that none should or could have. Info came from local and common knowledge in most cases. In respect to one sub-report, it was not clear how the visitor/reporter had gained ~~his~~ his info re SSD Spitzelverpflichtung of another person in his village. C. could not answer since he had not interviewed the visitor; another Referent had. It did not appear, in any case, that the report ^{should} ~~should~~ any particular access to the SS^D.

b. Report containing, inter alia, Soviet OB info re the Koenigsbrueck area.

c. Name trace results on four names earlier given for such purposes by C. There was no trace on any except Heinrich G., who came through W. Berlin as a refugee on approx 20/5/54. There was no further info in CARROIT, but the NAV would probably have a file on the man.

d. Written proposal addressed to Henard re cordoning off the main office building in the event of unforeseen trouble. The plan, as earlier discussed with C. envisages (1) immediate notification of the police, who will ~~stampede him~~ (2) dispatch six patrol cars to appointed spots. C says he can do no more in the matter. C. (or possible C.) must take the plan and lay it on with the police. C's opinion/guess was that the police will not agree to the plan, because they do not have the necessary resources to carry it out.

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e. Three copies of the monthly security check sheets, as earlier requested by [] C is in the process of completing all forms now, had a completed "Part I" (general-concerning the building and its outside aspects) for 29. He will complete one for 45XXXX by the end of the month. The second part is the individual room check. C will have this form completed for all rooms by the end of the month (there are approx 45 rooms ~~now~~ in all three buildings). The third part concerns distribution mechanisms used ~~in~~ during the month reported on, ~~now~~~~when~~ ~~now~~ This includes stamp purchases, envelope sealing procedures, and similar matters. Also to be fully completed for the month of Sept. Many of the points in the three parts of the report were discussed in some detail. C pointed out that in some respects the three parts overlap. [] said this was true and good-a double check on some matters was desirable. C agreed. No changes in the forms were suggested. It was also noted that according to earlier agreement with Larrison, the general building report ~~for~~~~now~~~~when~~ (part I) would not be filled out for ~~in~~ the K. area, since no single building is concerned, but only two offices; this would be adequately covered in Part II of the report. Pepin agreed.

2. [] requested a complete and up to date of all CADROIT personnel for the next meeting.

3. C requested any new ideas ~~now~~~~when~~ or solutions to the problem of destroying the CADROIT ~~files~~ files in the event of sudden trouble. [] said the point was obviously important, but he did not want to make any new ~~now~~ suggestions in this connection until he had thoroughly reviewed the work which had been done in this respect earlier. He knew that the matter had been much discussed by [] [] [] and C before. C noted that the gasoline which CADROIT presently has for the ~~purpose~~ would probably be inadequate for complete destruction for technical reasons.

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4. In respect to the CASTABIA problem, C gave the following instructions:
- a. As many Spitzelverpflichtete as possible should be induced to go to the CASTABIA house (merely a reaffirmation of previous instructions).
 - b. In any case were such a person, or any person appearing to have any access to the SSD, could not be flushed to the house because the interview took place after 1500 (when the CASTABIA house closes for business), all efforts should be made to ~~xxxxxxxx~~ set up another meeting. Is it possible for the person to go to the house on the next day? If this is not possible, C's report should show more clearly than a few recent reports have why it was not possible to get the person to the CASTABIA house on another day (C realized that most visitors have to return to the Zone on the same day—but report the details), and ~~xxxxxx~~ the best way to get in touch with the person later (C realized that the best way in many cases would only be the DDR address—put that down anyway, even if there is no better way to reach the visitor in the future). Such reports should also, of course, include full details of the visitors ~~xxxxxxxx~~ story; C made no special suggestions here, however, since ⁱⁿ ~~xxxxxx~~ C's reports have been pretty good/in this respect.
 - c. C had read with some care the two recent cases in which SSD agents were arrested by KS at CADROIT's instigation. It appeared that cases of this type might be the type to go to CASTABIA, and not to the police. C ~~xxxxxxxx~~ realized that in some cases it is hard for CADROIT to refuse turning the case over to the police, once the latter is brought into the picture. But in the future, all such cases should be reported to C before KS is informed. This would not mean that such cases would automatically go to CASTABIA, or that they would automatically go to KS. It ~~was~~ ^{was} known that such cases would be scrutinized by C ~~CC~~ C, and perhaps before a decision was made.

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Where appropriate, i.e., where there appeared to be access to the SSD, the cases would go to CASTABIA. Where there was no potential for CASTABIA, the cases would either go to K5 or remain with CADROIT. The main thing was reporting them before they go to the police.

d. During this and an earlier part of the discussion C ~~had~~ pointed out that in some cases a ~~Spitzelverpflichtete~~ was not interviewed by C, but, as it turned out, by some other CADROIT Referent. Should all of the Referenten be cut in on the CASTABIA program and instructed to flush suitable visitors? Pepin answered clearly no. C should try to have as many as possible of these persons sent to him for interviewing. Pepin realized that this would not be possible in all cases, but should be done to the extent possible. But ~~immed~~ the other Referenten were not brought into the program.

5. At the end of the CASTABIA discussion above, [] asked if C had any questions or reservations. If there were factors arguing against any part of the instructions, [] wanted to hear them, of course. They could then be discussed fully with all concerned. C said he had no questions; he understood perfectly. He then said that one difficulty with the CASTABIA program was that no one knew what happened to persons who were sent to the house, how they were handled, what the flap potential was, etc. This became particularly important in cases of the type [] had used as examples—cases where an SSD agent can be arrested and convicted in Western ~~countries~~ courts. [] said that this was true, but that it played no role in our handling of our end of the CASTABIA program. The possible flap potential ^{other} was fully realised by the people handling the CASTABIA program and appropriate care was taken. [] also took ~~a number~~ of occasions to stress that he and [] were acting as a team in their approach to CADROIT. Each knew ~~what~~ the other knew and acted together. C had no further questions.
NEXT MEETING: 1 OCT 54, 2000, SAME PLACE.